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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
VERNAL K. FRONK, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF UTAH in the inter-
est of VERNAL FLOYD FRONK, 
RICKY DEAN FRONK, and CINDY 
LEE FRONK, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
8734 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For the most part, respondent does not dispute the 
basic facts set forth in appellant's statement, but does place 
different emphasis and interpretation on some of them, as 
will be pointed out in the course of the argument below. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED THE APPELLANT NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE CUSTODY OF 
THE CHILDREN; AND THE COURT ACTED 
WITHIN ITS PROPER DISCRETION IN ISSU-
ING ITS ORDER. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN PERMANENTLY DEPRIV-
ING APPELLANT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
AND ORDERING THEM TO BE PLACED FOR 
ADOPTION RATHER THAN :MERELY CON-
TINUING THEM IN THE CUSTODY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE. 
POINT III 
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE WAS IN _-\ 
BETTER POSITION THAN THE COURT ON 
APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE MERIT AND 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, AND 
HIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE 
SHOWED THE APPELLANT NOT A FIT AND 
PROPER PERSON TO HAVE CUSTODY OF 
THE CHILDREN; AND THE COURT ACTED 
WITHIN ITS PROPER DISCRETION IN ISSU-
ING ITS ORDER. 
It is true that the Juvenile Court felt it had jur-
isdiction of the custody matter without the necessity of 
obtaining such jurisdiction through referral from the Dis-
trict Court by virtue of having held earlier proceedings 
involving said custody. It nevertheless is true also that the 
matter was referred by the District Court, and that the 
Juvenile Court Judge did accept it on that basis, and in do-
ing so and in conducting the hearing on June 10, 1957, the 
Juvenile Court did affirmatively adopt the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law made by Judge Wahlquist in the 
divorce proceedings, which findings are set out below and 
which clearly show that appellant was unfit to have custody 
of the children (R. 2). 
A determination as to appellant's character thus was 
made by two different courts, and the finding of both indi-
cated him to be lacking in certain necessary traits of char-
acter, and to be incapable of properly caring for the chil-
dren. 
In the June lOth proceeding, (R. 2) the trial judge 
took judicial notice of the findings and decree in a divorce 
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4 
action involving Mr. and Mrs. Fronk, out of which this 
matter arose. This the court was entitled to do by virtue 
of Section 78-25-1, U. C. A. 1953. See State v. Bates (Utah) 
61 P. 905. It was found in the divorce matter (and adopted 
by the court below) that "The defendant Vernal K. Fronk 
is not presently a fit and proper person to have the care, 
custody and control of the said minor children. He has not 
been shown to be law-abiding, honest or understanding of 
his children's needs or welfare." (Par. 5 of Findings of 
Fact.) 
It was found in the earlier proceeding and judicially 
noticed by the Juvenile Court trial judge that appellant had 
treated Mrs. Fronk cruelly, and that he had been convicted 
of a felony by a United States Military Court. (Par. 8, 
Findings of Fact.) 
The fact of conviction of a felony alone was considered 
of much importance by the Utah legislature in enacting 
Section 55-10-32, which section deals with the preferred 
right of parents to the custody of their children. There, 
one of the exceptions to the general rule that a child should 
not be taken from the custody of the parents is a situation 
where a "parent, having full custody and control over a 
child, or the child's legal guardian has been convicted of 
a felony * * * ." Here, of course, Mr. Fronk did not 
have full custody and control of the children in and of him-
self. 
Both Mr. and Mrs. Fronk were deprived of custody in 
the same proceeding at the same time. If the court now 
were to restore custody of the children to appellant, how-
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ever, having fully deprived his ex-wife of the custody on 
a permanent basis, he would again be covered by the above-
mentioned exception. While it is admitted that it is not 
mandatory to take a child from a parent having full custody 
upon said parent being convicted of a felony, nevertheless 
the language of the statute certainly would seem to indi-
cate the importance the legislature places on conviction of 
a felony. 
Appellant minimizes the seriousness of his conviction 
of the felony, and his subsequent incarceration in a federal 
military prison. Other jurisdictions have granted to their 
courts the right to determine whether custody should be 
denied on such basis. 41 L. R. A., N. S., 592; 39 Am. Jur. 
p. 617; Kelsey v. Green (Conn.) 37 Atl. 679. 
In re Case's Guardianship, cited by appellant to show 
that a felony conviction is not sufficient grounds for dep-
rivation of custody, was a case where the appellant had 
been incarcerated for a crime which occurred many years 
before. There, the court held that the conviction and im-
prisonment were too remote in time to have a bearing on 
the custody question. The situation is much different here. 
Appellant still was in confinement at the time of the Sep-
tember, 1956 hearing (which initially deprived him of 
custody) for a crime which had only recently occurred. It 
is clear that this would not be at all remote as to time. It 
should be noted that the findings and decree in the divorce 
matter were dated April 26, 1957, and that the hearing 
from which this appeal was taken occurred on June 10, 
1957, just six weeks afterward. It is beyond respondent's 
comprehension how the character of this man could so have 
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changed (particularly in light of the evidence introduced in 
the second hearing) in that short a period of time as in any 
way to weaken the effect of or make untimely the April 26th 
finding. 
In Kennison v. Chokie (Wyo.) 100 P. 2d 97, the court 
states: 
"It is stated in 22 C. J. 86, that proof of the 
existence at a particular time of a fact of a contin-
uous nature gives rise to an inference within logical 
limits that it exists at a subsequent time. That in-
ference has been applied in cases of reputation or 
character, of chastity, and of personal habits. 22 
c. J. 88." 
Appellant calls attention to a statement in 67 C. J. S. 
at page 659 to the effect that: 
"In order to establish unfitness, it must be 
shown that provision for the child's ordinary com-
fort or intellectual and moral development cannot 
be reasonably expected at the parents' hands." 
In the very next paragraph, it is stated that: 
"But it has been stated broadly that the require-
ment that the welfare of the child shall be the 
guide in awarding custody is satisfied if the parents 
are honest and responsible with a disposition and 
the capacity to maintain and educate the child." 
The text thereupon cites the case of In re Bourquin (Mont.) 
290 P. 250, where the court inferred that the parents must 
be honest in order to be entitled to custody of the child. As 
pointed out before, there has been a positive finding that ap-
pellant has not been shown to be honest (Par. 5, Findings of 
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Fact in Divorce) and therefore, according to the terms of the 
rule cited in the above text and case, appellant is not of 
sufficiently good character to retain custody of the children. 
Haines v. Fillner (Mont.) 75 P. 2d 803, well states the 
proposition that the welfare of the child is of paramount 
consideration. It says: 
"On the other hand, it is equally as firmly es-
tablished that the prima facie right of the parent is 
not absolute, but that the question of paramount 
importance is the welfare, present and future, of 
the child." 
Another Montana case, In re Thompson, 25 P. 163, states: 
"The rule which obtains in most of the courts 
of this country is that in awarding the custody of a 
minor, the welfare of the child is to be regarded 
more than the technical rights of the parents." 
In re Hogue, (N. M.) 70 P. 2d 764 states: 
"A child's welfare and best interest as control-
ling right to custody of child in adoption proceed-
ings is not measured altogether by material and 
economic factors, but parental love and affection 
must be considered." 
In Kennison v. Chokie, (Wyo.) supra, the court said: 
"The paramount question at all times in the 
custody and control of a minor child, is the welfare 
of such child." 
Appellant minimizes the importance of the evidence 
brought to bear on his character as it relates to custody of 
the children. It would seem that the fact that appellant 
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was shown to "run around" and that on an occasion he 
caused a serious disturbance in a tavern, while frightening 
and upsetting his ex-wife, is not without importance (R. 
14) particularly in that appellant chased his ex-wife into 
the ladies' rest room (R. 14) . The children's mother testi-
fied that she did not believe, on the basis of appellant's 
background, that he could be a good father to the children 
(R. 16) . Evidence then is adduced that he would not be a 
proper person to have custody of the children because of 
his running around with girls (R. 16); and that he did 
not stay home with the children and tend to his responsi-
bilities regarding them during the period in which his own 
mother had them, which is hardly proper conduct for a 
father (R. 16). 
Mrs. Gorter, the mother of appellant's ex-wife, testi-
fied that she thought appellant did not have love for his 
children, basing this estimate on the way appellant assoc-
iated with the first baby (R. 25). Other evidence as to 
appellant's immaturity is shown by appellant's calling his 
former in-laws on the telephone late at night and telling 
them their daughter was drunk (R. 27), whereas consider-
able testimony indicated she was not. 
Appellant's summary of the evidence presented against 
him in the June proceeding and set forth on page 8 of his 
brief is at best quite sketchy. In addition to failing to take 
into account some of the matters just mentioned, it fails 
to consider the fact that appellant also had served time in 
the Industrial School, according to Albert Wimmer, who 
knew the family well (R. 39). At page 32 of the transcript 
appellant attempts to detail his plans for taking care of 
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the children. An examination of his statements shows that 
his plans at best are very vague. He states "Well, I could, 
my aunt could take care of them at the home, or I could 
live with my aunt at her home up on-between 26th and 
27th." This sort of a life, with the father gone all of the 
time and an older woman caring for them during the day 
and probably several hours during the evening, would not 
be conducive to their proper care and growth. Clearly, the 
welfare of the children should come first, and they would 
certainly be much better off in a proper home as adopted 
children where they could receive the attention of both 
mother and father (R. 39). Findings in the divorce matter 
(paragraph 5) which were adopted by the Juvenile Court, 
state that Mrs. Fronk, mother of appellant, is not "such a 
fit and proper person because she shows gross hatred for 
the mother of the children, has indulged in physical violence 
with said mother, has shown inability to control her emo-
tions and evaluate problem situations in the months just 
past." It is obvious that the children would have consid-
erable association with this woman whether or not the aunt 
were to enter into the picture, which entry appears very 
indefinite. 
At R. 38 evidence is introduced showing that appel-
lant's mother was working full time during the day at Hill 
Field. The apparent indecision of appellant as to just how 
the children would be cared for in his absence while at work 
points up the importance of his establishing a good home 
life for them at such times as he should be unable to be with 
them. There is little question that from the ages of his 
aunt and his mother, and the fact of their having so many 
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outside interests that they would not be good people to care 
for young children. Appellant's aunt, in fact, has four 
grown and married children (R. 45) and is 63 years old 
(R. 47). 
The case of Clarke v. Lyon (Neb.), 118 N. W. 472; 20 
L. R. A., N. S. 171, states as follows: 
"The degree of unfitness which would deprive 
a parent of the natural right to the custody of his 
children, while it must be positive and not compara-
tive, must be considered in relation to the attend-
ing circumstances, such as the concern he has shown 
for them in the past, the suitability of his domestic 
parents to receive them, and the question of their 
general welfare." 
Appellant's brief refers to pages 31 and 32 of the rec-
ord, wherein evidence is set forth relating to appellant's 
employment status, income, attitude toward the children, 
and his plans for their care. This evidence is said to pre-
ponderate over the negative evidence described above. It 
should be noted that the evidence is constituted mostly of 
appellant's uncorroborated statements. Therefore they are 
mostly self-serving and certainly must be considered in 
that light. As to the substance of appellant's evidence, his 
earning power and his employment are not indicative of 
his rights to have the care and custody of the children. 
POINT II 
THE JUVENILE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN PERMANENTLY DEPRIV-
ING APPELLANT OF THE MINOR CHILDREN 
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AND ORDERING THEM TO BE PLACED FOR 
ADOPTION RATHER THAN MERELY CON-
TINUING THEM IN THE CUSTODY OF THE 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WELFARE. 
Respondent agrees with the first sentence under ap-
pellant's Point II. The statute mentioned does not place 
any limitation whatever on the period of time for which 
an offending parent may be deprived of custody, assuming 
the other statutory provisions under 55-10-32 and 55-10-30, 
U. C. A. 1953, are complied with. It is true also that spe-
cific standards of conduct are not exactly defined. The 
application of standards is for the judge of the case in-
volved acting on the basis of past precedents and his own 
best judgment after careful examination of the facts and 
upon observation of the demeanor of the witnesses. There-
fore, considering the words of the statutes alone, if the 
judge properly so decides, he may take custody from the 
parents for an unlimited period of time, even permanently. 
POINT III 
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE WAS IN A 
BETTER POSITION THAN THE COURT ON 
APPEAL TO DETERMINE THE MERIT AND 
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE AND THE 
CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, AND 
HIS DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. 
The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that the trial 
judge stands in a superior position to determine the facts 
of a case and that he is better equipped to pass on the evi-
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dence before him than is the court on appeal. This view is 
of general application. Specifically, it has been applied in 
a situation very similar to the one at hand in In Re Bradley 
(Utah), 167 P. 2d 978, cited by the appellants for another 
purpose. There the court said : 
"Cases involving the custody of the child are 
cases in equity, and the Supreme Court on appeal is 
required to determine the facts as well as the law, 
having in mind that the trial judge who heard and 
saw the witnesses was in a better position than the 
Supreme Court to weigh and evaluate the evidence." 
CONCLUSION 
It is respondent's conclusion that the Juvenile Court 
Judge acted within his discretion in permanently depriving 
appellant of custody of the child upon a preponderance of 
the evidence, which showed appellant not to be a fit and 
proper person to have such custody. The Juvenile Court did 
not abuse its discretion in ordering the children placed for 
adoption, rather than merely continuing them in the cus-
tody of the Welfare Department. 
Again referring to the oft-cited rule of law that the 
welfare of the child is more important than the natural 
right of parents to keep custody of their children, we 
strongly urge the Court to uphold the decision of the Juv-
enile Court below in placing the children out for adoption. 
The children, during the last few months, have been trans-
ferred from place to place and been subjected to strong and 
contrary influences, and respondent believes that any fur-
ther indecision as to their status will be most damaging to 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
their characters and personalities. As previously stated, 
there appears to be no statutory prohibition against the 
permanent deprivation of custody in such a case. 
In the event this court decides that the children should 
not be taken permanently from the custody of appellant, it 
would appear that the children nevertheless should be con-
tinued under the jurisdiction of the Welfare Department 
until such time as a further order is entered. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decree of the Juv-
enile Court of the First District should stand. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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